University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
Departmental Papers (CIS)

Department of Computer & Information Science

June 2003

Observational Determinism for Concurrent Program Security
Stephan A. Zdancewic
University of Pennsylvania, stevez@cis.upenn.edu

Andrew C. Myers
Cornell University

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/cis_papers

Recommended Citation
Stephan A. Zdancewic and Andrew C. Myers, "Observational Determinism for Concurrent Program
Security", . June 2003.

Copyright 2003 IEEE. Reprinted from Proceedings of the 16th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop
(CSFW 2003) pages 29-43.
Publisher URL: http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/tocresult.jsp?isNumber=27273
This material is posted here with permission of the IEEE. Such permission of the IEEE does not in any way imply
IEEE endorsement of any of the University of Pennsylvania's products or services. Internal or personal use of this
material is permitted. However, permission to reprint/republish this material for advertising or promotional
purposes or for creating new collective works for resale or redistribution must be obtained from the IEEE by writing
to pubs-permissions@ieee.org. By choosing to view this document, you agree to all provisions of the copyright laws
protecting it.
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/cis_papers/53
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

Observational Determinism for Concurrent Program Security
Abstract
Noninterference is a property of sequential programs that is useful for expressing security policies for
data confidentiality and integrity. However, extending noninterference to concurrent programs has proved
problematic. In this paper we present a relatively expressive secure concurrent language. This language,
based on existing concurrent calculi, provides first-class channels, higher-order functions, and an
unbounded number of threads. Well-typed programs obey a generalization of noninterference that
ensures immunity to internal timing attacks and to attacks that exploit information about the thread
scheduler. Elimination of these refinement attacks is possible because the enforced security property
extends noninterference with observational determinism. Although the security property is strong, it also
avoids some of the restrictiveness imposed on previous security-typed concurrent languages.

Comments
Copyright 2003 IEEE. Reprinted from Proceedings of the 16th IEEE Computer Security Foundations
Workshop (CSFW 2003) pages 29-43.
Publisher URL: http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/tocresult.jsp?isNumber=27273
This material is posted here with permission of the IEEE. Such permission of the IEEE does not in any way
imply IEEE endorsement of any of the University of Pennsylvania's products or services. Internal or
personal use of this material is permitted. However, permission to reprint/republish this material for
advertising or promotional purposes or for creating new collective works for resale or redistribution must
be obtained from the IEEE by writing to pubs-permissions@ieee.org. By choosing to view this document,
you agree to all provisions of the copyright laws protecting it.

This conference paper is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/cis_papers/53

Observational Determinism for Concurrent Program Security
Steve Zdancewic

Andrew C. Myers

Department of Computer and Information Science

Computer Science Department

University of Pennsylvania

Cornell University

stevez@cis.upenn.edu

andru@cs.cornell.edu

Abstract

This paper makes two contributions. First, it presents a
deﬁnition of information-ﬂow security that is appropriate for
concurrent systems. Second, it describes a simple but expressive concurrent language with a type system that provably enforces security.
Notions of secure information ﬂow are usually based on
noninterference [15], a property only deﬁned for deterministic systems. Intuitively, noninterference requires that the
publicly visible results of a computation do not depend on
conﬁdential (or secret) information. Generalizing noninterference to concurrent languages is problematic because these
languages are naturally nondeterministic: the order of execution of concurrent threads is not speciﬁed by the language semantics. Although this nondeterminism permits a variety of
thread scheduler implementations, it also leads to reﬁnement
attacks in which information is leaked through resolution of
nondeterministic choices (in this case, scheduler choices).
These attacks often exploit timing ﬂows, covert channels that
have long been considered difﬁcult to control [20].
Several recent papers have presented type systems for secure information ﬂow in concurrent languages [43, 38, 41,
5, 19, 29, 36]. The type systems of these languages enforce
secure information ﬂow; but most of these type systems are
so restrictive that programming becomes impractical.
The secure concurrent language presented in this paper,


 , addresses both of these limitations.  has been
proved to enforce a generalization of noninterference for
concurrent systems, based on low-security observational determinism. Much of the restrictiveness of prior security type
systems for concurrent languages arises from the desire to
control timing channels; we show that some restrictiveness
can be avoided by distinguishing different kinds of timing
channels. This approach opens up a trade-off between the
observational powers of an attacker and the restrictiveness
of the enforcement mechanism. In some situations, the more
restrictive model of the attacker may be warranted, but in
other cases, the less restrictive model is acceptable.
The concurrency features in most previous secure lan provides fairly
guages have been limited. By contrast, 
general support for concurrency: it allows an arbitrary number of threads, it supports both message-passing and shared-

Noninterference is a property of sequential programs that
is useful for expressing security policies for data conﬁdentiality and integrity. However, extending noninterference to
concurrent programs has proved problematic. In this paper we present a relatively expressive secure concurrent language. This language, based on existing concurrent calculi,
provides ﬁrst-class channels, higher-order functions, and an
unbounded number of threads. Well-typed programs obey a
generalization of noninterference that ensures immunity to
internal timing attacks and to attacks that exploit information about the thread scheduler. Elimination of these reﬁnement attacks is possible because the enforced security property extends noninterference with observational determinism. Although the security property is strong, it also avoids
some of the restrictiveness imposed on previous securitytyped concurrent languages.

1

Introduction

Type systems for tracking information ﬂow within programs
are an attractive way to enforce security properties such as
data conﬁdentiality and integrity. Recent work has proposed
a number of security-typed languages whose type systems
statically check information ﬂow, ranging from simple calculi [28, 45, 17, 1, 38, 49, 41, 19, 18] to full-featured languages [27, 50, 30, 4]. Many systems for which information security is important are concurrent—for example, web
servers, databases, operating systems—yet the problem of
checking information ﬂow in concurrent programming languages has not yet received a satisfactory solution.
This research was supported in part by DARPA Contract F30602-99-10533, monitored by USAF Rome Laboratory, by ONR Grant N00014-01-10968, by NSF CAREER Award 0133302, by NSF Grant 0208642, and by
a Sloan Research Fellowship. The U.S. Government is authorized to reproduce and distribute reprints for Government purposes, notwithstanding any
copyright annotation thereon. The views and conclusions contained herein
are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the ofﬁcial policies or endorsement, either expressed or implied, of
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the Air Force
Research Laboratory, or the U.S. Government.
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2.1 Noninterference and nondeterminism

memory styles of programming, and communication chan is not intended
nels are themselves ﬁrst-class values. 
to serve as a user-level programming language (its syntax
and type system are too unwieldy). Instead, it is intended
to serve as a model language for studying information ﬂow
and concurrency; nevertheless, using these constructs, one
can encode (via CPS translation) other security-typed languages [49].
The approach taken here is to factor the information security analysis into two pieces: a type system that eliminates both explicit and implicit storage channels, and a racefreedom analysis that eliminates timing channels. Factoring
the security analysis makes both the information-ﬂow analysis and its proof of correctness more modular. In addition,
any improvements in the accuracy of alias analysis (used to
detect races) lead directly to improvements in the security
analysis. This paper focuses mainly on the type system for
explicit information ﬂows, but race freedom is discussed in
Section 4.3.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Sections 2 and 3 present and argue for our deﬁnition of information security and also informally describes our concurrent programming model and its security implications.
. Section 5
Section 4 gives the formal deﬁnition of 
states our soundness results, including the security theorem.
(Full proofs are available in the dissertation of the ﬁrst author [48].) Section 6 covers related work, and the paper concludes in Section 7.

2

Suppose that we have a low-equivalence relation  that relates two program expressions  and ¼ if they differ only in
high-security input data. Here  (“zeta”) is a label that deﬁnes “high-security”: high-security data is any whose label
 does not satisfy    . The low observer (attacker) can see
only data protected by  .
For example, consider pairs  , where  ranges over
some high-security data and  ranges over low-security data.
An observer with low-security access (only permitted to see
the  component) can see that the pairs    
and      are different (because  ), but
will be unable to distinguish the pairs    
and     . We have:

     
    
  

   
   

Noninterference says that this equivalence relation also
captures the distinctions that can be made by observing the
execution of the two expressions; an observer able to see only
low-security data learns nothing about high-security inputs
by watching the program execute. Suppose we have an evaluation relation    . Evaluations of two expressions will be
indistinguishable as long as they produce indistinguishable
results: If   ¼ , then

    ¼


¼



¼

(1)

Note that values  and  ¼ need not be strictly equal. The
equivalence relation  on values captures the idea that the
low-security observer may be unable to see certain parts of
the program output—it relates any two values whose differences are not observable by the low observer.
This deﬁnition of security is appealing, although it does
permit high-security information to leak through termination
behavior. Because termination behavior communicates an
average of one bit of information in an information-theoretic
sense, we follow common practice by ignoring this covert
channel [8, 45, 17, 27].
This deﬁnition does not apply straightforwardly to concurrent languages. First, the idea that a program terminates with a single result is less appropriate for a concurrent
language, where programs may produce observable effects
while continuing to run. This can be addressed by describing the observations about program execution as a ﬁnite or
inﬁnite event trace. Suppose that a machine conﬁguration 
consists of a pair    where
is the state of the memory
and  is the executing program. The statement   means
that the conﬁguration  may produce the execution trace
. For the language deﬁned in this paper, the event trace
consists of the sequence of memory states        
that occur as the program executes.
A second, more signiﬁcant difﬁculty with concurrent languages is nondeterminism; there may be many traces such
that   . For example, the language presented below
has a nondeterministic operational semantics that allows any

Security model

Information security is fundamentally connected to the ability of an observer to distinguish different program executions. Our primary concern is conﬁdentiality. An attacker
must be prevented from distinguishing two program executions that differ only in their conﬁdential inputs, because the
attacker might otherwise learn something about the inputs.
As usual, we assume that there is a lattice of security
labels [7, 11]. Lattice elements describe restrictions on the
propagation of the information they label; labels higher in
the lattice describe data whose use is more restricted. For
conﬁdentiality, labels higher in the lattice describe more conﬁdential data whose dissemination should be restricted. In
this paper we will leave the lattice abstract; however, it is
often useful to think about the simple two-point lattice containing just the elements (low) and  (high), where  
but  
The terminology “ is protected by  ” is used to indicate
that    —intuitively it is secure to treat data with label
 as though it has label  because the latter label imposes
more restrictions on how the data is used. The terms “highsecurity” and “low-security” describe data whose labels are
relatively high or low in the lattice, respectively.
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assignment      might happen to fall on the same
cache line as a piece of data used by another apparently secure program running on the same system. If accesses to
this other data are conditioned on conﬁdential information,
it could make the assignment      more likely to
come last, winning the write–write race. Thus, an attacker
might learn about conﬁdential data by introducing such programs into a running system. Attacks of this sort have been
demonstrated [42].

possible interleaving of the evaluations of two parallel processes. Informally, there are two rules for evaluating an expression ½
¾ where the symbol represents parallel composition:1

  
  

¼
¼

 
 
¼

¼

 
  

¼
¼

 
  
¼

¼

The thread scheduler resolves this nondeterminism by
choosing a thread to run at each execution step.
A standard way to handle nondeterminism is a possibilistic generalization of noninterference in which the computations of two expressions are considered indistinguishable as
long as every possible computation of one expression is pos¾
sible for the other expression as well [23]; that is, ½
must imply:

½  ½  ½  ¾  ¾  ¾  ½
¾  ¾  ¾  ½  ½  ½  ½

¾
¾

2.2 Internal vs. external timing
Many previous security-typed language approaches for concurrent programs [43, 41, 19, 5, 36] aim to prevent highsecurity information from affecting the termination behavior
and timing behavior of a program. This decision strengthens
possibilistic noninterference by considering execution time
to be observable by the low-security observer. Conﬁdential
information thus cannot be encoded in the execution time of
one thread and then transferred to a second thread, as in the
following example that exploits thread timing behavior:

(2)

If the evaluation relation is deterministic, this security
condition is noninterference. Importantly, it can be proved in
essentially the same way as noninterference. One common
technique is to show that each step of computation preserves
the low-level equivalence between conﬁgurations [15, 45].
However, a system that satisﬁes the possibilistic security
condition may have a reﬁnement that does not. As a result,
an observer may be able to distinguish two such programs
by comparing the probabilities of possible executions. For
example, consider this program:

  

    

 

  
        
     

This program initializes variable  to  and then spawns
two threads. The ﬁrst thread assigns  the value    either
immediately or after a delay. The second thread waits long
enough that the assignment to  is likely to have occurred
when is false; this thread then assigns  the value of .
Depending on the thread scheduler, this program can reliably
copy the contents of into the variable —an information
leak. Its bandwidth can be increased by placing the code
inside a loop.
If program execution time is considered low-observable,
information ﬂow control requires that the execution time of
low-equivalent programs be equal. Because proving statements about execution time is difﬁcult, the type systems proposed to enforce this security condition have tended to be
very restrictive. For example, these type systems have usually ruled out programs like the following, because its running time depends on high-security information:

(A)

Here the boolean variables  and are low- and high-security
locations respectively. This program is secure if the low
observer cannot distinguish between the following two programs:

  
  

    
    

  
    

(A1)
(A2)

Suppose that the low observer is unable to distinguish two
traces if their ﬁnal memories have the same values in location . In both programs the location  may end with the
contents  or   , so the possible low observations of
the two programs are identical. However, an attacker may
be able to infer some information about the initial value of
. For example, the thread scheduler may tend to run the ﬁnal expression of the three last, so that the second program
usually has the effect   . If the scheduler randomly
chooses ready threads to execute,  will be more likely to
contain than  . In general, if the distribution of the ﬁnal
values of  is different in the two programs, it is undoubtedly
because the assignment   is leaking information about
via (perhaps probabilistic) reﬁnement of thread scheduler
nondeterminism.
    
Even the simple program   
might be used to violate conﬁdentiality, despite not mentioning high-security data. For example, the code for the
1 The

(B)



  
(C)
             
A related way to treat timing channels is to pad code to
eliminate them [3, 36], for example by ensuring that the same
time is taken by both branches of an . However, this approach does not easily handle loops, recursive functions, or
instruction-cache effects.
Here we have taken a different approach, drawing a distinction between the internally and externally observable
timing behavior of programs. External observations are
those made by an observer outside the system, timing the
program with mechanisms external to the computing system. Internal observations are those made by other programs

actual operational semantics of 
 is given in Figure 3.
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running on the same system. In principle, internal observations are more easily controlled because other programs can
be subjected to a validation process before being allowed to
run. Typically, internal observations also offer greater potential for high-bandwidth information transfer, so they may
also be more important to control. In this work, the focus is
on controlling information ﬂows that are internal to the system. Because there are many external ﬂows, most of which
are difﬁcult to control (e.g., conversation between users of
the system), and other techniques that can be applied to controlling them (e.g., auditing, dynamically padding total execution time), this decision seems reasonable.
The beneﬁcial effect of this decision is that example (C) is
considered secure because its timing channels are only external; example (B) is considered insecure because it contains
an internal timing channel made observable by a race.

though the ordering of these writes is nondeterministic. Disallowing races reduces the expressiveness of the language,
but because races are difﬁcult to reason about, programmers
rarely use them intentionally; races are usually bugs.
Making programs race-free weakens the ability of a
thread to observe the behavior of other threads. The observational powers of the low observer are weakened correspondingly. This weakening is expressed formally in the relation
¼
that captures when the low observer is able to distinguish two traces. Two traces and ¼ are related if they
are equivalent up to stuttering and preﬁxing at every memory
location, considered independently of other locations.
To be more precise, let , a memory, be a ﬁnite map
 is the contents of
from locations to values . Then
location . Let
 be the projection of the trace
onto a
single memory location ; that is, if   


then
    



.
A
sequence
of

values  
 is related to another sequence of val
¼
ues  ¼ ¼ ¼
 if
for all up to the length of the

¼
if for all locations ,

shorter sequence. Then

is equivalent up to stuttering to ¼ , or vice versa.
Combining this deﬁnition of trace equivalence with observational determinism (3) yields a new security condition that
allows high-security information to affect the external termination and timing behavior of a program, while preventing
any effect on internal termination and timing behavior.
Two aspects of this deﬁnition merit discussion. First, allowing one sequence to be a preﬁx of the other permits an
external nontermination channel that leaks one bit of information, but removes the obligation to prove program termination. However, this decision implies that the  relation on traces is not an equivalence relation (transitivity
  
,
fails). To see why, consider the three traces
and
   
 ,    
 , we have 


 but     . Consequently, we prove the security property in terms of a more primitive simulation relation
º (deﬁned in Section 5.3) that is transitive.
Second, considering each memory location independently
is justiﬁed because internal observations of the two locations
can only observe the relative ordering of their updates by
using code that contains a race—and programs containing
races are disallowed. By requiring only per-location ordering of memory operations, this deﬁnition avoids the restrictiveness incurred by timing-sensitive deﬁnitions of security.



The weaknesses of possibilistic security conditions (e.g., (2))
led McLean [24] and Roscoe [32] to propose that noninterference be generalized to nondeterministic systems as lowsecurity observational determinism. Low-security observational determinism is essentially noninterference as given
above (1), but applied to a nondeterministic system. In our
framework the observational determinism can be expressed
straightforwardly. Similarly to noninterference, we have two
and ¼ that the low obarbitrary initial conﬁgurations
¼
). To avoid information
server cannot distinguish (
ﬂows, they must produce indistinguishable traces and ¼ :

 

¼

 
¼



¼









 


    
        
   
     

 

 

2.3 Low-security observational determinism







(3)

Thus, to a low-level observer who is unable to distinguish
states that differ only in high-security components, a system
satisfying this condition appears deterministic.




2.4 Race freedom
To obtain deterministic results from the low-security viewpoint, it is not necessary that evaluation itself be deterministic, which is fortunate because nondeterminism is important.
Nondeterministic evaluation allows thread scheduler behavior to depend on aspects of the run-time system not under
the programmer’s control: for instance, the operating system, the available resources, or the presence of other threads.
The problem is how to permit useful nondeterminism without creating security holes.
Our insight is that requiring race freedom is a solution
to this problem. To be considered secure, a program must
enforce an ordering on any two accesses to the same memory
location, when at least one of the accesses is a write. This
ordering ensures that the sequence of operations performed
at a single memory location is deterministic.
Race freedom rules out insecure programs like example
(A) because it has a write–write race to the location . However, the program        is considered secure because it writes to two different locations, even




      
  

 


3 Synchronization mechanisms
The previous section presents a new security condition for
concurrent imperative programming languages. A concurrent language can be made more expressive by exploiting the
added ﬂexibility in the condition. This section and the next
present such a language, called 
 .
The race freedom requirement of the security deﬁnition
implies that threads cannot asynchronously communicate

through shared memory. Consequently, 
 uses message
passing for interthread communication, and the communica-
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tion is regulated to prevent illegal information ﬂows. Also,
because the security deﬁnition relies on sequencing writes
 needs a thread synchronization mechato memory, 
nism. Despite its importance for practical concurrent programming and impact on information-ﬂow properties, synchronization has only recently been studied in the context of
 provides a threadinformation security [19, 30, 18]. 
synchronization mechanism based on the same abstraction it
uses for message passing.

Linear handlers are guaranteed to be invoked exactly once
unless the computation diverges. Consequently, no information is transmitted by the fact that the linear handler is run.
Furthermore, linear handlers cannot create nondeterminism
because there is never any send contention. These observations enable more precise information-ﬂow checking.
Channel arguments are given a security label that restricts
what data may be sent on them. This suggests an alternate
formulation of the security condition of Section 2.3: a program could be equipped with a distinguished output channel
that accepts only low values, and we could require that the
sequence of values sent on the output channel is deterministic. A distinguished input channel would also be required to
allow the program context to acknowledge the output. The
difference between the two approaches is not large, because
memory locations can be viewed as external processes that
receive messages at every write.

3.1 Message passing
To support both thread synchronization and communication,

 uses message passing. The programming model of

 is based on the join calculus [13], which supports ﬁrst extends it with linear channels and
class channels; 
linear handlers. This linear synchronization mechanism provides additional structure that allows the type system to more
accurately describe synchronization information ﬂows.
 notation for sending a value on a channel is
The 
 . Messages may contain no data, in which case the send
is written , or they may contain multiple values, in which
case the send is written    . A send on a channel
may cause the activation of a corresponding message handler
(or simply handler), for example:     
When a message is sent on channel , the handler triggers,
creating a new thread to execute    with the message
contents bound to the variable . The message is consumed
by the handler. Handlers may invoke their own channel, allowing encoding of loops and recursive functions.
Handler deﬁnitions are introduced via  -syntax. For
 program described above is:
example, a 







  

3.2 Synchronization
 has not addressed the issue of synchronization
So far, 
between concurrent threads. Rather than directly incorporating mutexes or semaphores as primitives, we adopt join
patterns as found in the join calculus [13]. With this design,
handlers may block waiting for messages on multiple channels, permitting synchronization on several threads of execution. For example, the following handler waits for messages
on channels   and   before starting the thread
“ ”.
½ Ü 

 
  





 

Ü

Ý   

If some of the channels in the join pattern never receive a
message, the handler never triggers.
This approach simpliﬁes reasoning about synchronization. Unlike mutexes or semaphores, which may be used
anywhere within a program, join patterns limit synchronization to points at which messages are received.
Despite this abstraction2, join patterns support a range
of useful synchronization idioms [13]. In particular, they
provide synchronous message passing between two threads.
Suppose thread  wants to send the message  synchronously on the channel  to thread  , after which it continues as  . Thread  blocks waiting for the message 
and then continues as thread  . In traditional messagepassing notation, this situation might be expressed by the following program:

 

Multiple threads might attempt to send messages on a single channel concurrently, creating send contention and possibly race conditions. Lexical scoping of channel names
makes it impossible to introduce receive contention, in which
multiple handlers vie for a message.
 channels are ﬁrst-class and may be passed as valIn 
ues in the messages sent on other channels. For example, the
channel  sends two (empty) messages on any channel
it is given as an argument:




¾ Ý 

  
 

Ordinary handlers remain permanently in the program environment once declared, and are able to react to any number
 also supof messages sent on the channels they deﬁne. 
ports linear channels, on which exactly one message must be
is used in place of  to indicate that a
sent. The symbol
message handler is linear. For example, the following program declares a linear channel  that must be used exactly
once along each execution path, as shown in this example:

    È½   È¾ É½   ÜÉ¾ Ü  



Writing    for sequential composition of (sequential)
processes  and  , this example can be written using
’s join patterns:


          
      



 
  
      

2 Join
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patterns could be implemented using mutexes or semaphores.




     

     
   
            


security loop guards [38, 36]. However, 
 does rule out
programs that other systems consider secure [17, 38, 19, 36],
because those programs allow reﬁnement attacks. It is our
belief that these different approaches embody a tradeoff in
secure systems design. In cases where absolute security is
mandatory, the more restrictive languages may be required.
However, there are many circumstances in which external
timing and termination channels are acceptable risks.
Linearity is an important feature because it improves reasoning about implicit ﬂows: information ﬂows arising from
program control structure [8]. In the producer-consumer example of Figure 1, knowing that the code at is executed
gives no more information than knowing that  was executed. Linearity makes it possible to determine this despite
the complex control structure. Prior secure concurrent languages are either unable to express this program or reject
it as insecure, which is unfortunate because the producerconsumer idiom is useful.

 

/o /o /o Ê/o ½/o /o o/ /o / C
É/o ½/o / mmmm6
CC
CC
QQQQ Ê
! Ì
Èo/ /o / mmmm6
¾
( /o o/ / Q
QQQ Ë
m6 o/ /o /
CCC
m
m
(
m
CC
m6 /o o/ /
!
/o /o /o É/o ¾/o /o /o /o / mmm
Figure 1. Nonnested synchronization

 also allows join patterns for linear channels. For

example, the program below declares a handler for two linear
channels  and  :

     



 

Channels  and  must be used exactly once in each possible execution path of the process .

Join patterns in 
 permit complex synchronization
behavior. For instance, the program shown in Figure 1 has
the synchronization structure pictured there, where wavy arrows represent computation and straight arrows represent
process forking or synchronizing message sends. The example is a single-message producer-consumer pair. Note that
this program uses channel  inside the body of the handler
deﬁning channels  and  .
The typical synchronization mechanisms for sharedmemory programming are locks, such as mutexes and

semaphores. Like other process calculi [26, 13], 
 does
not directly support these mechanisms. Though their addition would be straightforward, locks do not interact with information ﬂow analysis as congenially as message-passing
does. Locks are primarily used to obtain atomicity, which
is useful for writing correct programs, but it provides little
help in reasoning about timing ﬂows. For example, given a
critical section controlled by a mutex, the order of arrival of
two threads can leak as much information as if there were no
mutex. Locks can be used as limited message-passing mechanisms, and it is plausible that a precise information ﬂow
analysis could be constructed for those uses.

4


 : A secure concurrent calculus


This section introduces the formal semantics for 
 , including its syntax, operational semantics, and type system.

4.1 Syntax and operational semantics
Figure 2 shows the syntax for 
 programs. Base val are channel names , memory locations , or
ues in 


booleans  and . The metavariable ranges over channels
and variables that have channel or linear channel type. A
process (“thread” and “process” are used interchangeably)
 consists of a sequence of -declarations and primitive
operations followed by either the terminal process , an 
expression, or    . Message sends and handlers are
as described in the previous section. Nonlinear join patterns
may bind linear variables (although they are not required
to), but linear join patterns never bind linear variables. This
restriction prevents problems in sequencing linear sends.

It is helpful to deﬁne a sequential subset of 
 : processes not containing the  symbol. If    is a sequential
process that contains one free linear channel variable , the
process   is sugar for  
    .
Figure 2 also describes a program’s dynamic state. A
contains channel handler deﬁnitions in addition
memory
to ordinary mappings between locations and their values; its
domain is generalized to include the join patterns deﬁnes.
The function    is the set of locations  and join patterns that appear in . If      then we write
 for the value such that    . Similarly,
if    , we write   for the (open) process 
such that
   . A synchronization environment 
stores the linear handlers that have been declared by the program, using similar notation. Program-counter labels ( )
are used to track implicit information ﬂows [49, 30]. The
syntax   associates a top-level process  with a 
label. A collection of such processes running concurrently is



3.3 Expressiveness
Security-typed languages rule out apparently insecure programs and thus may reduce expressiveness. While 
 has
a relatively rich collection of features in comparison with the
previous work, it is difﬁcult to directly compare expressiveness because of the differing deﬁnitions of security.

Channels in 
 are quite expressive. A channel is an
extension to a continuation: both accept a value and cause

some computation to occur, possibly using the value. 

is in fact an extension of a secure CPS language introduced
in the authors’ earlier work [49]. Thus adding concurrency
causes no loss of expressiveness, unlike in various previous secure concurrent languages that have ruled out high6
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Figure 3. 

Figure 2. Process syntax & notation
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called a process pool. A machine conﬁguration is a triple
, where
is a memory, is a synchronization
environment, and is a process pool.
,
Figure 3 contains the operational semantics for 
instrumented to track information ﬂow within executing
programs—that this instrumentation is correct is the purpose
of the security proof. The rules deﬁne a transition relation
   between machine conﬁgurations, though space
limitations preclude full explanation of the semantics. Evaluation of primitive operations is described by a large-step
  prim  .
evaluation relation
The evaluation rule for a process about to do a memory
   updates the contents of
update    
memory location to contain a security value whose label
is bounded below by , the security label of the reference
itself (needed to prevent information leaks through aliasing)
and  (needed to prevent implicit information ﬂows).
The two rules for evaluating conditional expressions show
how the program counter label approximates the implicit information ﬂows that arise due to program control behavior.
The process           evolves to the
process      , where the new program counter label
is the join of the old one and the label of the value that regulates the conditional—any assignment operations that occur
in  will propagate the label   and so track the implicit
information introduced by the branch.
Note that the rules for evaluating handler deﬁnitions install their handlers in the appropriate environment, with the
channels renamed to prevent collisions; linear handlers also
record the  at the point of their deﬁnition. Correspondingly, the rules for sending messages look up the channel in
the appropriate environment and start a thread to execute the
body. The rule for the new  differs between linear and
nonlinear messages; in the linear case the  of the sending
context(s) is discarded and the  existing at the evaluation
of the handler is used instead—possibly lowering . Linearity ensures that this is safe [49]: once the handler has been
reached, it must also be invoked (unless that thread of control does not terminate). Therefore, the future computation
learns nothing from its invocation.
The operational semantics in the ﬁgure are too rigid: they
require the right-most processes to take part in the computational step. Because thread scheduling should ignore the syntactic ordering of process pools and processes running concurrently, we introduce structural equivalences on processes
and process pools, allowing arbitrary reordering of items
separated by , and discarding of halted processes ( ). These
structural equivalences (    ,    ) are the least
symmetric, transitive congruences allowing these transformations. Finally, two machine conﬁgurations
  
and
    are structurally equivalent if they are equivalent and    .
The syntax-independent operational semantics is given by
the transition relation
deﬁned from the  relation by
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Figure 4. Type syntax



  




composition with structural equivalence:
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 type system



 has a nonstandard type system that enThe language 
forces the security condition. Figure 4 shows the types for

 programs. They are divided into security types and linear types. Base types, , consist of booleans, channel types,
and references; security types are pairs consisting of a base
type and a security label annotation.
The channel type     has any number of nonlinear arguments and at most one linear argument. The  
component of a channel type is a lower bound on the security level of memory locations that might be written to if a
message is sent on this channel.
The linear types are channels   that accept nonlinear
arguments. A linear message does not itself reveal information about the sending context (although its contents might),
so linear channel types do not need a   component.
The security lattice is lifted to a subtyping relation on

 types, in the usual manner [45, 49]. In particular, nonlinear channel types are contravariant in both their -label
and their argument types; reference types are invariant.
is a ﬁnite map from nonlinear variA type context
ables to their types. Linear type contexts are ﬁnite maps
from linear variables to linear types. A memory type,
(for heap), is a mapping from locations and channels to their
types. A synchronization state type similarly maps linear
channels to their linear types.
The typing judgments are deﬁned by the rules in Figure 5. These judgments make use of auxiliary judgments













  





Î
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that ensure values, linear values, and primitive operations are
well-typed (Figure 6). For space reasons we have omitted
the straightforward judgments for deciding that memories,
synchronization environments, and process pools are wellformed, as well as the subtyping and subsumption rules.
The type system guarantees the following properties:
Explicit and implicit insecure information ﬂows are
ruled out, if the program is also race-free.
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Figure 5. Process typing
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,
Typing judgments have the form
is well-typed in the context
which asserts that process
deﬁned by , , , , and a program-counter label .
Nonlinear contexts
permit weakening and contraction,
whereas linear contexts do not; thus, a process typed assuming a set of linear message handlers must use all of them.
The type system uses the  label to bound what can be
learned by seeing that the program execution has reached .
The   component of the judgment is thus a lower bound
on the label of memory locations that may be written by .
The rule that increases  is I F, because branching transfers
information to the program counter.
Most of the typing rules are similar in spirit to those in
recent security-typed languages [17, 49, 30], though there
are a few rules of special interest.
Concurrent processes ½
¾ are checked using the
program-counter label of the parent process, as shown in rule
PAR of Figure 5. The two processes have access to the same
nonlinear resources, but the linear resources must be partitioned between them.
The typing rules L ET and L ET L IN make use of auxiliary operations that extract variable binding information
from handler deﬁnitions. A join pattern yields a collecof channels it deﬁnes and a set of variables bound in
tion
the body of the handler deﬁnition  . For nonlinear join
patterns, the linear variables form a synchronization context
. The operation
, deﬁned in Fig 

ure 7 collects these channel names and variables for nonlinear join patterns and assigns them types. A similar operation

  deﬁned for linear join patterns extracts
the synchronization point and the context for the handler
body,  .
Rule L ET checks the body of the handler under the assumption that the arguments bound by the join pattern have
the appropriate types. Nonlinear handlers cannot capture
free linear values or channels, because that would potentially violate their linearity. Consequently, the only linear
resources available inside the body ½ are those explicitly
passed to the handler:  . Note that the channels deﬁned
by the nonlinear handler ( ) are available inside the handler
body, which allows recursion. The process ¾ has access
to the newly deﬁned channels (in ) and to the previously

À





Channel names introduced by a linear handler are used
exactly once in each possible future execution path.

À
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4.3 Race prevention and alias analysis
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As discussed above, two concurrently running threads might
leak conﬁdential information if they have write–write or
read–write races. Rather than further complicating the type
system with race-condition analysis, we assume that a separate program analysis rejects programs that contain such
races. This strategy modularizes the proof of security: Any
program analysis that soundly guarantees race freedom can
be used in conjunction with this type system.
The remainder of this section formalizes our race freedom
condition and sketches some ways that existing technology
can be used to determine whether a given program satisﬁes
the condition.
Intuitively, the deﬁnition of race freedom requires that
steps performed by parallel threads can be interleaved in any
is race-free whenever
order. Formally, a conﬁguration
£
¼ and ¼
¼
and

 and   
¼¼ and
imply that there exists an ¼¼ such that 
¼¼ . An open term is race-free whenever its closed

instances are race-free.
This is a strong notion of race freedom (it implies conﬂuence), though certainly sufﬁcient to rule out timing leaks
that may occur between threads. It is possible to weaken the
deﬁnition of race freedom to consider harmful only nondeterminism apparent from the memory, but even with a weakened deﬁnition of race freedom, nondeterminism on nonlinear channels can cause races.
There are a number of ways to establish race freedom.
One approach is to use an alias analysis to soundly approximate the set of locations and channels written to (or sent
messages) by a thread . Call this set  . By determining which locations are potentially read by (a set
 ), an analysis can prevent races by requiring the following (and its symmetric counterpart) for any subprograms
 and  that might execute concurrently:

½

¾
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on a linear channel. Note that the contents of the messages
are labeled with the  label, because the linear message
might contain information about the program counter.
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 value and operation types
Figure 6. 
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Figure 7. Join pattern bindings



available resources. Rule L ETLIN operates similarly but external linear channels may be used in the handler body.3
The rule for type-checking sends on nonlinear channels
requires that the channel type and the types of the values
passed in the message agree. Also, the program counter at
the point of the send must be protected by the label of the
message handler, which rules out implicit information ﬂows.
Sending a message on a linear channel does not impose
any constraints on the  label at the point of the send, because there is no information revealed by the act of sending











            
An alias analysis constructs ﬁnite models of the dynamic
behavior of a program in order to approximate which references are instantiated with which memory locations at run
time. The more closely the abstract model agrees with the
true behavior of the system, the more accurate aliasing information can be. Formulating such an alias analysis is orthogonal to this work; instead, we have simply stated the
race-freedom property the analysis must enforce.
One trivially sound analysis is to assume that any process
might read or write any reference. Such a rough approximation to the actual aliasing forces the program to be sequential. A second possibility is to ensure that references and
nonlinear channels are used sequentially. Simple syntactic
constraints can enforce this property [31]. Sequentiality can

3 Unlike the related linear-continuation type system [49], the type system
presented in Figure 5 does not explicitly enforce any ordering constraints on
the use of linear channels, relying instead on race freedom. Race freedom
implies that there is a causal relationship between the linear synchronization
handlers such that any two handlers that interfere are totally ordered. Interfering linear handlers are used sequentially, so updates to memory locations
mentioned in the handlers are deterministic.
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also be formulated in the type system [19], but doing so is
rather complex.
Another possibility is to track aliasing directly in the type
system [40, 46], which would potentially permit very ﬁnegrained control of concurrency. More generally, pointer
or shape analysis can be used to approximate   and
’s sequential core is
 
 [21, 9, 10, 33]. Because 
essentially an imperative language with , we expect that
these existing alias analyses can be adapted to this setting.

5

For values:

      
 
     








For linear values:

   







Deﬁnition 5.2 ( -simulation) Let º be the relation (mutually) inductively deﬁned as shown in Figures 8, 9, 10, 11 and
in the rules below.
For conﬁgurations: S IM -C ONFIG

  º 
    º  
      º 
           º      


Subject reduction is a crucial ﬁrst step of the security
proof because it establishes that evaluation preserves wellformedness.





¼

¼

¼

¼

¼

¼

¼

¼



¼



¼

Proof: The proof is by cases on the evaluation step used.
A number of additional lemmas are needed:



Substitution: the usual lemmas for type preservation
when substituting for linear and nonlinear variables;
Weakening: preservation of typing judgments when
program counter labels are lowered or heap types and
¾
synchronization environments are extended.







5.2 Observational equivalence



 -equivalence

 

 


  º   
        º 
   
       
   º
  
  










The most important part of the º relation is
S IM -H IGH -P ROC . This rule says that any process that is
well typed with a  label not protected by can be simulated by the process that just sends a response on each of
the linear channels. Intuitively, this simulation bypasses all

The -equivalence relation indicates when two values look
the same to a low-level observer.





For processes that are well-typed with 
, the º
relationship acts homomorphically on the typing rule of the
term, replacing the judgment    with the equivalence rule       (and similarly for primitive
operations). For example, the simulation for conditionals is
derived from the typing rule I F:

channels in their intersection.

Deﬁnition 5.1 ( -equivalence) Let

 : SIM-HIGH-PROC
          
       º 
 

For processes with 

      and           
Then there exist
and  such that         .
Furthermore,
extends , and  and  agree on the






Lemma 5.1 (Subject reduction) Suppose that







5.1 Subject reduction





Generalizing -equivalence to processes is more involved
because there can be both high-security and low-security
computations running simultaneously, making it harder to
relate corresponding parts of subprograms. Bisimulationbased proof techniques for noninterference are no longer appropriate. Rather than giving a deﬁnition of  for traces
directly, we instead give a simulation relation º . Two programs are then -equivalent if they can both be simulated by
the same program.
The simulation relation is induced by the typing structure
º ¼
of a source machine conﬁguration. Intuitively, if
¼
then conﬁguration
can simulate the low-security behavior
of while ignoring both the timing and termination behavior of the high-security computation in .

We now present more formally the security condition that
 language enforces and give an outline of the proof
the 
techniques used.
 programs satisfy the determinism-based
Well-typed 
security condition described informally in Sections 2.3 and
2.4. The proof strategy is to show that regardless of the highsecurity inputs to a program, its low-security memory access
behavior can be simulated by a single, deterministic program
that differs only in its high-security parts. The existence of
a common simulation implies that low-security behavior reveals nothing about the inputs.
The remainder of this section sketches the proof that the
type system in conjunction with a race-freedom analysis
implies the security condition. A complete proof is available [48].

¼





5.3 Process simulation

Security condition

¼

 





(written

 ) be the family of symmetric binary relations inductively
deﬁned as follows.
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of the potential high-security computation performed in
and simply returns via the linear-channel invocations. Im¼
portantly, for high-security process º
the simulation
¼
always terminates, even if does not; the simulation ignores the termination behavior of .
Observe that any value returned from a high-security context via linear channels must itself be high-security, because
its label must protect that context’s program-counter label.
Therefore, it does not matter what value is returned in the
 -simulation because that value is not observable anyway.
Also note that if there are no linear channels in the context, the rule S IM -H IGH -P ROC says that º —the highsecurity process
has no way of affecting low-security
memory locations, so from the low-security view, may as
well not exist.
In this setting the º relation is more fundamental and
easier to work with than , because is not transitive and
hence not an equivalence relation. Two machine conﬁgurations are  -equivalent if they are both simulated by the same
conﬁguration:





S IM -B INOP
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Figure 8. Primitive operation simulation
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Figure 9. Memory simulation
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S IM -S-E MPTY

Proof: By induction on the derivation of    ; the
inductive hypothesis must be extended to the other judgment
forms. The one interesting case is S IM -H IGH -P ROC , which
holds because each free linear channel  mentioned in is
used exactly once in the simulation    .
¾
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S IM -S-H ANDLER

Lemma 5.3 (-simulation) If     º  and
  ¼ then either ¼ º  or there exists  ¼ ,  ¼,
and ¼ such that   ¼ and  ¼  ¼  ¼ º ¼ .















Now we establish that the simulation respects the operational semantics.



 













Figure 10. Synchronization environment simulation
S IM -N ONE

Proof:
This is proved by separately considering lowsecurity and high-security evaluation steps (    and
   , respectively). In either case it is shown that a step
of  can be simulated by zero or one steps performed by
its simulation  . The proofs are by cases on the evaluation
step taken by  . A similar -simulation result follows.

¾



S IM -D EREF

To prove that 
 satisﬁes the security condition, we
ﬁrst show that the simulation preserves typing and respects
the operational semantics.

 





 



 






Deﬁnition 5.3 ( -equivalence for conﬁgurations)
Conﬁgurations  and  are  -equivalent, written
   
 , if and only if there exists a conﬁguration  such that     º  and     º .

Lemma 5.2 (Simulation preserves typing) If
and     º ¼ then    ¼ .



S IM -VAL
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¼





S IM -P ROC

Î
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Next, we show that the race-freedom condition implies deterministic updates. Given a conﬁguration  

, we deﬁne   as  .

S IM -E Q



Figure 11. Process pool simulation
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Lemma 5.4 (Race freedom and determinism) Suppose
£
that both ´¼ ¼µ £
´ ¼µ and
´¼ ¼µ
´¼  µ where
the last step of each evaluation sequence makes a lowobservable change to location , but no prior step does.
Then ´ ¼µ   ´¼  µ .

Proof: By Lemma 5.5 there exists a conﬁguration ¼ that
simulates both conﬁgurations. Suppose, for the sake of con
tradiction, that the evaluations disagree on the
update
to the location . We derive a contradiction by induction on
, using Lemma 5.4.
¾

Proof: By induction on
lated lemmas that use race freedom to reason about equivalence of conﬁgurations after single syntax-independent eval¾
uation steps.

Note that in order to establish that a given program is secure, not only must the program be well-typed, but all of its
-simulations must be race-free. An easy lemma shows that
º ¼ and is race-free then ¼ is race-free. Conif
sequently, it sufﬁces to perform the race-freedom analysis
on the original source program—if the original program is
race-free, all of its simulations are too.

Î

Î






 , applying a collection of re-




To talk about programs that differ only in high-security
inputs, we use substitutions. A substitution is a ﬁnite map
from variables to values. If is a typing environment and
is a substitution, we write  to mean that assigns
each variable a value of the type required by . The notation
 is short-hand for simultaneous capture-avoiding substitutions. We write  ½  ¾  if the two substitutions
satisfy and map each variable to equivalent values given
heap type .
The following lemma says that starting from a conﬁguration with an open process pool and closing it under equivalent substitutions yields equivalent conﬁgurations.








 



6 Related work
There has been a long history of information-ﬂow research
based on trace models of computer systems [14, 23, 16, 25,
47] and process algebras [34, 39, 35]. Early programming
languages work in this area was initiated by Denning [8] and
Reynolds [31].
A few researchers have investigated noninterferencebased type systems for concurrent languages and process calculi. Smith and Volpano have assumed a ﬁxed number of
threads and a uniform thread scheduler; however, their work
accounts for probabilistic thread scheduling and relaxes the
constraints due to timing channels [43, 44, 41].
McLean [24] and Roscoe [32] proposed determinismbased deﬁnitions of noninterference for trace-based and
labeled-transition systems. Their approach has not been used
previously in type systems for programming languages.
Focardi and Gorrieri [12] have implemented a ﬂowchecker for a variant of Milner’s calculus of concurrent systems (CCS). Honda et al. have proposed a similar system
for the -calculus in which they can faithfully encode Smith
and Volpano’s language [19]. Their work relies on a sophisticated type system that distinguishes between linear channels, afﬁne channels, and nonlinear channels. Both of these
approaches use bisimulation to prove possibilistic noninterference properties. A similar approach is taken by Abadi
and Gordon to prove the correctness of cryptographic protocols in the Secure Pi Calculus [2], but they do not enforce
information-ﬂow policies.
Hennessy and Riely consider information-ﬂow properties
in the asynchronous -calculus [18]. Like the deﬁnition used
here, their may-testing version of noninterference is timingand termination-insensitive, though possibilistic. Their language does not support synchronous communication or reﬁnement of the ﬂow analysis via linearity constraints.
Pottier [29] gives an elementary proof of possibilistic
noninterference for a variant of the -calculus, but its type
system is restrictive because it does not make a distinction
between linear and nonlinear channel usage. Conchon [6]
also gives a similar information analysis for the join calculus, with a strong security condition based on bisimulation.





Lemma 5.5 (Simulations and high-substitution)
Suppose the following hold:
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Then for any conﬁguration
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Proof: An easy induction on the typing derivation for process pool . The inductive cases follow from the construc¾
tion of º .

5.4 Determinism-based security
Given the technical machinery above, we can state the security theorem as follows.
Theorem 5.1 (Determinism-based security) Let
arbitrary label in the security lattice. Suppose that





be an

       
Let an initial memory  be given such that    and
suppose that whenever      
º the simula  be given such
tion is race-free. Let location   
that
    . Further suppose that
   .
Then for any two values  and  such that        the
sequence of values stored in memory location  during the
evaluation of  
  is a preﬁx of the sequence of
  (or vice-versa).
values stored in  by  
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Conclusions

This paper makes two contributions: ﬁrst, it presents and
formalizes in a language setting a deﬁnition of information
security based on observational determinism. This deﬁnition
has the advantage over possibilistic security properties that
it is immune to reﬁnement attacks, eliminating covert channels based on the observation of the probabilities of possible
results. Two insights make the observational determinism
an effective basis for a security condition: internal and external timing channels are treated differently, and programs
are required to be race-free, eliminating their ability to obtain information from the internal timing channels. Based
on these insights, the attacker is formally modeled as having
less power to observe differences between program executions, with the result that the security deﬁnition avoids some
of the restrictiveness of alternative noninterference deﬁnitions. Thus, this work allows a tradeoff in expressiveness
based on an estimation of the power of the attacker.
The second contribution is a demonstration that this new
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